https://www.osisecurity.com.au/moodle-url-manipulation-remote-account-information-disclosure.htmlDate:04-Apr-2017Product:MoodleVersions affected:2.4.10, 2.5.6, 2.6.3, 2.7 and earlier.Vulnerability:Information disclosure.Example:/user/edit.php?id= reveals account owner name1. Log in to http://demo.moodle.net/ as user student:sandbox.2. Click view profile when logged in (student is id=4).3. Change id parameter from 4 to 3, which is the teacher(http://demo.moodle.net/user/profile.php?id=3). The HTML response says'Terri Teacher' who the 'student' user has access to.4. Change id parameter to 2(http://demo.moodle.net/user/profile.php?id=2). The HTML response says"The details of this user are not available to you" and the navigationbar above says "Home / My profile / View profile / User".5. Note that it says "User" - but hides the name!6. Change the URL from profile.php to edit.php(http://demo.moodle.net/user/edit.php?id=2).7. The HTML message is "Sorry, but you do not currently havepermissions to do that (Edit user profile)" ... BUT, the navigationbar says "Home / Users / Admin User".Voilà! The account name is "Admin User"Effective on university websites which have 1+ million end users.Credit:Discovered by Patrick WebsterDisclosure timeline:29-May-2014 - Discovered during audit, reported to tracker.11-Jul-2014 - Fix committed MDL-45760.14-Jul-2014 - Patch released for 2.4.11, 2.5.7, 2.6.4, 2.7.1.04-Apr-2017 - Public disclosure.About OSI Security:OSI Security is an independent network and computer security auditingand consulting company based in Sydney, Australia. We provide internaland external penetration testing, vulnerability auditing and wirelesssite audits, vendor product assessments, secure network design,forensics and risk mitigation services.We can be found at http://www.osisecurity.com.au/
OpenSource Security Ralf SpennebergAm Bahnhof 3-548565 Steinfurtinfo@os-s.netOS-S Security Advisory 2017-01Date: April 4th, 2017Authors: Simon Heming, Maik Brüggemann, Hendrik Schwartke, Ralf SpennebergCVE: not yet assignedCVSS: 10Affected Device: Schneider Modicon TM221CE16R, Firmware 1.3.3.3Title: The password for the application protection of the SchneiderModicon TM221CE16R can be retrieved without authentication. Subsequentlythe application may be arbitrarily downloaded, uploaded and modified.Severity: Critical. The protection of the application is not existant.Ease of Exploitation: TrivialVulnerability type: Information DisclosureVendor contacted: December 23rd, 2016AbstractThe Application Protection is used to prevent the transfer of theapplication from a logic controller into a SoMachine Basic project. Asimple command (seen below) can be send via Modbus over TCP port 502 tothe logic controller and it will return the password unencrypted.// bash commandecho -n -e '\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x05\x01\x5a\x00\x03\x00' | nc IP 502After that the retrieved password can be entered in SoMachine Basic todownload, modify and subsequently upload again any desired application.Vendor ContactedWe contacted the vendor. Apart from the first acknowledgement of thereceipt of the report we did not receive any further information.PDF: https://www.os-s.net/advisories/OSS-2017-01.pdf
OpenSource Security Ralf SpennebergAm Bahnhof 3-548565 Steinfurtinfo@os-s.netOS-S Security Advisory 2017-02Date: April 4th, 2017Authors: Simon Heming, Maik Brüggemann, Hendrik Schwartke, Ralf SpennebergCVE: not yet assignedCVSS: 10Affected Device: Schneider SoMachine Basic 1.4 SP1, Schneider ModiconTM221CE16R, Firmware 1.3.3.3Title: The password for the project protection of the Schneider ModiconTM221CE16R is hard-coded and cannot be changed.Severity: Critical. The protection of the application is not existant.Ease of Exploitation: TrivialVulnerability type: Information DisclosureVendor contacted: December 23rd, 2016AbstractThe Project Protection is used to prevent unauthorized users fromopening the protected project file by prompting the user for a password.The XML file is AES-CBC encrypted, however the key used for encryptionis hard coded and cannot be changed. The key used for encryption is:“SoMachineBasicSoMachineBasicSo
Ma”. After decrypting the XML file withthe standard password the user password can be found in the decrypteddata. After reading the user password the project can be opened andmodified with SoMachine Basic.Vendor ContactedWe contacted the vendor. Apart from the first acknowledgement of thereceipt of the report we did not receive any further information.PDF: https://www.os-s.net/advisories/OSS-2017-02.pdf